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I. INTRODUCTION
Children are taught the most basic common courtesy, apologizing, not long
after they learn to speak. 1 While children are expected to say, “I’m sorry,” there
are different expectations of and consequences for adults, particularly in professional settings. 2 “As we age, it becomes more difficult to acknowledge harms
caused because . . . we are . . . afraid of the consequences that truth-telling sometimes demands.” 3 Can physicians tell patients they are sorry? Should they? In
recent years, amidst an ever-increasing fear of litigation, so-called physician apology laws have gained traction in the United States. 4 In fact, apology laws—revisions of state evidentiary codes that prohibit the introduction of expressions of sympathy—are in the lead for the nation’s most widespread tort reform. 5 Consequently,
medical professionals and those who represent them in malpractice suits have
started to pay more attention to the efficacy of saying “I’m sorry.” 6
Apologies are not just a way for providers to demonstrate empathy, they are
also a tool for reducing medical malpractice claims and promoting alternatives to
trial in the healthcare setting. 7 Due to the widespread enactment of apology statutes,
most U.S. physicians do not have to choose between an instinctive, sympathetic
reaction and self-preservation following adverse medical outcomes. 8 Although the
language and application of these statutes varies widely across jurisdictions, sympathy is generally no longer synonymous with guilt and cannot be construed as such
* B.S.B.A. and Master of Health Administration. J.D./M.B.A. Candidate 2020, University of Missouri. The author would like to thank Sam F. Halabi, Associate Professor of Law, for his constant feedback and encouragement. She also thanks her parents, Mona and Behrouz Afrassiab, for sharing their
passion for and appreciation of the health professions.
1. Robin E. Ebert, Attorneys, Tell Your Clients to Say They’re Sorry: Apologies in the Health Care
Industry, 5 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 337, 338 (2008).
2. Id. at 338 (stating the intrinsic human behavior of apologizing taught to children does not translate
well into adulthood); Lee Taft, Apology and Medical Mistake: Opportunity or Foil?, 14 ANNALS HEA
LTH L. 55, 55 (2005).
3. Taft, supra note 2, at 55.
4. Nicole Saitta & Samuel D. Hodge, Jr., Efficacy of a Physician’s Words of Empathy: An Overview
of State Apology Laws, 112 J. AM. OSTEOPATHIC ASS’N 302, 302 (2012), http://jaoa.org/article.aspx?arti
cleid=2094499.
5. Benjamin J. McMichael, R. Lawrence Van Horn & W. Kip Viscusi, ‘Sorry’ Is Never Enough:
How State Apology Laws Fail to Reduce Medical Malpractice Liability Risk, 71 STAN. L. REV. 341, 345
(2019).
6. Saitta & Hodge, supra note 4, at 303.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 302 (referencing physicians’ moral dilemma: “wanting to soothe the feelings of the patient
or family while simultaneously wishing to avoid having an apology used against him or her in court”).
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in court. 9 While there are many criticisms of apology statutes and little data to
support their effectiveness, they should not be altogether dismissed. There is still a
largely untapped opportunity to employ alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in the
context of medical malpractice litigation. 10 Apology laws, when used as a means of
facilitating mediation, may be just what the doctor ordered to heal the broken malpractice system. 11
This article argues apology statutes fit well within existing ADR mechanisms
and have the potential to prompt use of ADR—specifically mediation—on a
broader scale in the medical field. Just as apologies from provider to patient have
cathartic (and potentially financial) value, so does mediation between them, much
more so than litigation. “Alternative dispute resolution models mitigate stress on
clinicians, de-emphasize tendencies of health systems to try to hide fault, and help
avoid dragging clinicians, patients, and others through time-consuming, costly, and
reputation-damaging litigation.” 12 Together, then, apology statutes and mediation
can begin to address an issue policymakers have struggled to combat for decades:
frequent, costly, and relationship-altering litigation of medical malpractice claims.
Section II of this comment analyzes several seminal cases that prompted and
shaped apology law. Next, Section III situates apology law within the broader context of medical malpractice litigation. Section IV reviews previous attempts to apply ADR techniques in the healthcare setting. Section V discusses problems within
the current tort system and is followed by commentary on the breadth of apology
acts and the efficacy of saying “I’m sorry” in the medical context in Sections VI
and VII, respectively. Finally, the discussion concludes by reiterating the opportunity an apology-mediation approach presents to promote doctor-patient communication and, consequently, further legislative goals.

II. CONTEXT THROUGH CASES
Patients bring claims of medical negligence by asserting their doctor failed to
do what a reasonable provider in the same specialty would have done in a similar
situation. 13 To establish a case of medical malpractice negligence, a plaintiff must
plead and prove the following four elements: “(1) the applicable standard of care;
(2) a breach of that standard of care; (3) an injury; [and] (4) proximate cause between the breach of duty and injury.” 14 If the patient prevails, he or she can be
compensated for medical bills, lost earnings, and/or pain and suffering. 15 Patients
seeking relief have a high burden to bear, as they must demonstrate the defendant

9. Id.
10. David H. Sohn & B. Sonny Bal, Medical Malpractice Reform: The Role of Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 470 CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS & RELATED RES. 1370, 1371, 1377 (2012) (stating “ADR has
the potential to help reform the current tort system, reducing cost and increasing both parties’ satisfaction
. . . The current political and legal environment is optimal for embracing ADR.”).
11. Id. at 1374.
12. Joseph S. Kass & Rachel V. Rose, Medical Malpractice Reform: Historical Approaches, Alternative Models, and Communication and Resolution Programs, 18 AMA J. ETHICS 299 (2016).
13. Lydia Nussbaum, Trial and Error: Legislating ADR for Medical Malpractice Reform, 76 MD. L.
REV. 247, 255 (2017).
14. Marlynn Wei, Doctors, Apologies, and the Law: An Analysis and Critique of Apology Laws, 39 J.
HEALTH L. 107, 110 (2006).
15. Nussbaum, supra note 13, at 255.
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physician’s sub-standard care by a greater weight of the evidence. 16 Hence, they
may attempt to use physicians’ sympathetic statements to indicate culpability, negligence, or failure to meet the standard of care.
The cases summarized below formed the canon of apology jurisprudence. Each
case predates enactment of its respective state’s apology statute and serves to illustrate why physicians have historically been reluctant to apologize to patients following adverse outcomes. 17 Regardless of each fact-dependent outcome, 18 these
cases all offer examples of courts admitting physician apologies as evidence in civil
malpractice suits, thereby demonstrating the need for legislative intervention. 19
In Cobbs v. Grant, 20 a patient who underwent surgery for an ulcer brought a
claim in the Superior Court of Alameda County after experiencing complications. 21
He was discharged a little over a week later, but returned the next day with severe
abdominal pain; emergency surgery revealed internal bleeding, and Dr. Grant made
the decision to remove the source of the bleed, the patient’s spleen. 22 Two weeks
after that, the patient again returned home, only to develop another, more severe
ulcer four months later. 23 When a strict diet and medication did not ease the patient’s pain, doctors again performed surgery and removed part of his stomach. 24
After recovery and discharge, the patient was readmitted a fourth time for postsurgery complications. 25 The patient testified Dr. Grant “blamed himself for me
being back in there (the hospital for a second time)” and emphasized Dr. Grant’s
testimony that surgery is not always necessary to treat ulcers. 26 The jury found for
the patient, but Dr. Grant appealed, and the California Supreme Court reversed the
decision, holding Dr. Grant’s statements signified “compassion” or “remorse,” as
opposed to an admission of negligence. 27
In Senesac v. Associate in Obstetrics and Gynecology, 28 a physician performed
an emergency hysterectomy after perforating the patient’s uterus during an abortion. 29 The patient sued in the Superior Court of Chittenden County, alleging the
doctor negligently performed the abortion. 30 In spite of the patient’s claims the
doctor “admitted that she had made a mistake,” the doctor won a directed verdict,
and the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed, stating the doctor’s expressed failure to

16. Taft, supra note 2, at 89.
17. Wei, supra note 14, at 110.
18. Ebert, supra note 1, at 348.
19. Wei, supra note 14, at 110.
20. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal.3d 229 (1972).
21. Id. at 235.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Cobbs, 8 Cal.3d at 237-38.
27. Id. at 238 (“Defendant’s statement that surgery is not usually warranted is not an admission of a
negligent decision to operate when all the medical experts testified that in plaintiff’s case surgery was
indicated . . . [D]efendant’s statement signifies compassion, or at most, a feeling of remorse, for plaintiff’s ordeal. Since a medical doctor is not an insurer of result, such an equivocal admission does not
constitute a concession that he lacked or failed to use the reasonable degree of learning and skill ordinarily possessed by other members of the profession in good standing in the community, or that he failed
to exercise due care.”).
28. Senesac v. Assocs. in Obstetrics & Gynecology, 141 Vt. 310 (1982).
29. Id. at 312.
30. Id.
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live up to her own personal standards was not equivalent to a departure from the
ordinary standard of care. 31
In Lashley v. Koerber, 32 a woman visited her doctor with an injured finger. 33
In the Superior Court of Alameda County, she testified that rather than ordering an
X-ray, the physician sent her home and requested she come back every two weeks
so he could monitor the healing process. 34 Approximately two months later, the
patient independently obtained an X-ray, which revealed arthritis had prevented the
fracture from healing. 35 The patient’s husband testified that when his wife voiced
frustration that her earlier requests for an X-ray were ignored, Dr. Koerber responded, “Yes, I know, it is not your fault, Mrs. Lashley, it is all my own.” 36 In
reversing a nonsuit and finding in favor of the patient, the California Supreme Court
noted Dr. Koerber’s use of the word “fault” signified his “responsibility for wrongdoing” or “failure” to exercise ordinary care. 37
In Woronka v. Sewall, 38 a woman developed second degree burns from a sterilizing solution applied to her legs and backside during labor. 39 In an action brought
in the Superior Court of Suffolk County, the woman testified that upon examining
the burns, the doctor said, “My God, what a mess; my God, what happened here. It
is a darn shame to have this happen. . . . [I]t was because of negligence when they
were upstairs.” 40 The judge directed a verdict for the doctor, but the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts sustained the patient’s exceptions on appeal. The
court held the doctor’s references to “negligence” and explicit description of the
cause of injury were not merely excusable “statements of regret.” 41
In Greenwood v. Harris, 42 a physician advised his patient she had a tumor that
needed to be removed right away. 43 During surgery, the physician discovered the
31. Id. at 314-15 (“[T]he asserted statement of Dr. Gray that she ‘made a mistake, that she was sorry,
and that it [the perforation of the uterus] had never happened before’ does not establish a departure from
the standard of care ordinarily exercised by a reasonably skillful gynecologist. The fact the physician
may have believed, and, if so, verbalized the belief that her performance was not in accordance with her
own personal standards of care and skill, is not sufficient in the absence of expert medical evidence
showing a departure from the standards of care and skill ordinarily exercised by physicians in similar
cases.”).
32. Lashley v. Koerber, 26 Cal.2d 83 (1945).
33. Id. at 84.
34. Id. at 85.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 86.
37. Id. at 90 (“The jury would have a right to believe that defendant, as a physician and surgeon, was
using the word ‘should’ to import the duty which he, as a physician and surgeon practicing his profession
in that community, owed to his patient in the exercise of ordinary care . . . coupled with defendant’s
statement as to what he should have done ‘in the beginning’ is the admission that the failure to have an
X-ray taken was all his own ‘fault.’ The word ‘fault’ in one of its meanings signifies ‘[r]esponsibility for
wrongdoing or failure; culpable cause.’”).
38. Woronka v. Sewall, 320 Mass. 362 (1946).
39. Id. at 363-64.
40. Id. at 364.
41. Id. at 366 (“It is no answer to say that the statements that the negligence occurred ‘upstairs’ did
not show that it took place in the delivery room. Some of the admissions were specifically related to the
delivery room and to the time of delivery. . . . It is likewise no answer to say that the admissions were
merely statements of regret, sympathy, and benevolence evoked by human suffering. This is, of course,
true of the statements that it was a ‘shame’ and ‘unfortunate.’ But it is in no way true of the references
to ‘negligence’ and to the definite declaration that the burns were attributable to the solution being on
the ‘mat’ and to the plaintiff’s skin being exposed to the solution ‘for too long a period.’”).
42. Greenwood v. Harris, 362 P.2d 85 (1961).
43. Id. at 86.
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patient did not have a tumor, but she was pregnant. 44 At trial in the District Court
of Oklahoma County, the patient’s husband testified the doctor approached him afterwards and stated, “Your wife is approximately three to three and a half months
pregnant, this is a terrible thing I have done, I wasn’t satisfied with the lab report,
she did have signs of being pregnant. I should have had tests run again . . . I am
sorry.” 45 After a verdict in favor of the physician, the patient appealed. 46 The Supreme Court of Oklahoma reversed and remanded, stating as follows: “We can interpret these statements in no other way than as an admission that a faulty diagnosis
had been made due to the failure of the defendant to use and apply the customary
and usual degree of skill exercised by physicians in the community.” 47
Given precedent such as this, it is no wonder there are difficulties convincing
physicians that apologies and disclosure are not just right, but effective. “The legal
considerations of a physician’s actions have not always been at the forefront of a
physician’s mind while treating a patient, but the litigious nature of today’s society
has changed this dynamic.” 48

III. THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MALADY
The abovementioned cases occurred over a period of time when the number of
medical malpractice cases in the U.S. was increasing dramatically. The 1960s represented the height of the litigation boom. 49 Forty years later, the Institute of Medicine’s jarring report on medical errors, To Err is Human, 50 shone new light on the
devastating, widespread effects of human fallibility. 51 Thereafter, physicians, understandably fearful of litigation, grew more prone to practicing “defensive medicine.” 52 Doctors who perceived an increased threat of being sued started practicing
differently, ordering duplicative tests or prescribing unnecessary treatments to safeguard themselves against claims they did not meet the applicable standard of care. 53
Defensive medicine is problematic, as it “moves the focus of medical care away
from the best interests of the patient toward the best interests of the physician,”
resulting in unproductive, cost-intensive, and even potentially harmful care. 54 According to the American Medical Association, “our medical liability system causes
health care expenditures to be higher than they otherwise would be” because “the
fear of lawsuits affects the way in which physicians practice.” 55
44. Id.
45. Id. at 87.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 88.
48. Saitta & Hodge, supra note 4, at 304.
49. Kass & Rose, supra note 12.
50. INST. OF MED. ET AL., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (2000).
51. Nussbaum, supra note 13, at 283.
52. Kass & Rose, supra note 12.
53. Haavi Morreim, Malpractice, Mediation, and Moral Hazard: The Virtues of Dodging the Data
Bank, 27 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 109, 115 (2012) (defining defensive medicine as “tests and procedures ordered by physicians principally to reduce perceived threats of medical malpractice liability”).
54. Kass & Rose, supra note 12 (“Defensive medicine is medical practice performed primarily to limit
future risk of a successful lawsuit against the physician and only secondarily to adhere to the medical
standard of care.”).
55. Medical Liability Reform NOW!: The Facts You Need to Know to Address the Broken Medical
Liability System, AM. MED. ASS’N 5 (2018), https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/ama-assn.org/files/corp/
media-browser/premium/arc/mlr-now.pdf.
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Why are doctors so afraid? The chart below summarizes trends in U.S. medical
malpractice over the past three decades. 56 The blue bar graph, which coincides
with the left axis, represents the total number of claims (in thousands) filed against
physicians—both Medical Doctors and Doctors of Osteopathic Medicine—that resulted in a payout. 57 The orange line graph, which coincides with the right axis,
illustrates the total amount paid (in billions) as a result of those lawsuits. 58

As this chart demonstrates, “deny and defend” is a costly and often ineffective
way to respond to malpractice claims. 59 The number of paid claims was highest in
2001, at just over 16,000. 60 In 2017, there were a little over half as many claims:
8,400. 61 Total payout was highest in 2004, reaching 4.42 billion dollars, and last
year, paid claims totaled 3.23 billion. 62 The number of paid claims has decreased
by approximately 45% since the turn of the century, while the total amount paid has
decreased by less than 18%. 63 This suggests that over time, patients have won fewer
cases, but payouts in those cases have increased dramatically. 64 Legislators, observing these trends, hypothesized unmeritorious claims and unreasonably inflated
jury awards were the cause of the malpractice crisis, and lawmakers reacted accordingly. 65

56. David Belk, Malpractice Statistics, TRUE COST OF HEALTH-CARE, http://truecostofhealthcare.org/malpractice_statistics/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2019) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM
AN SERVICES, National Practitioner Data Bank (2017)).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Richard C. Boothman, Amy C. Blackwell, Darrell A. Campbell, Jr., Elaine Commiskey & Susan
Anderson, A Better Approach to Medical Malpractice Claims? The University of Michigan Experience,
2 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 125, 129 (2009).
60. Belk, supra note 56.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Nussbaum, supra note 13, at 256. Note: there are differences between states.
65. Id. at 250.
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IV. AILING ATTEMPTS AT ADR
Unfortunately, various reforms designed to combat the rise in malpractice litigation have only exacerbated the problem. 66 Recently, states have tried to limit
litigation by implementing interventions, including some ADR techniques like
screening panels and pretreatment arbitration agreements, but such interventions
have not had the intended result. 67 In addition, the National Practitioner Data Bank
(NPDB), originally created to help health facilities identify poorly performing (negligent-prone) providers, has hindered doctors’ willingness to engage with these interventions. 68
Screening panels issue non-binding judgments advising patients whether or not
to pursue litigation and exist in seventeen jurisdictions. 69 While lawmakers hoped
these neutral evaluations would conserve resources by discouraging non-meritorious claims, empirical studies found them ineffective. 70 The panels may actually
increase costs to the parties by evaluating claims that would otherwise have settled
and claims that inevitably proceeded to litigation. 71
Arbitration clauses included in hospital intake agreements, admissions materials, or enrollment documents have had a similar effect; rather than reducing medical
liability system costs, they spread payouts among a higher percentage of claims. 72
Moreover, arbitration has many of the same drawbacks as traditional litigation, i.e.,
it is both adversarial and binding. 73 States have reacted differently to pretreatment
arbitration agreements, with some courts holding them enforceable and others ruling them invalid. 74 This uncertainty prompted the continued search for alternatives. 75
The NPDB, a part of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 76 mandates reporting malpractice payments and requires institutions to review the data
during the physician credentialing process. 77 Though well-intended, the NPDB’s

66. Id. at 264.
67. Id. at 266.
68. Morreim, supra note 53, at 127-30.
69. Nussbaum, supra note 13, at 267-69 (Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Utah, Virginia, Wyoming, and the U.S. Virgin Islands).
70. Id. at 270-71 (stating panels might actually increase litigation by giving patients access to less
costly expert testimony).
71. Id. at 271.
72. Id. at 273-76.
73. Id. at 277.
74. Id. at 274-75.
75. Nussbaum, supra note 13, at 277.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 11101(1) (2018) (“The increasing occurrence of medical malpractice and the need to
improve the quality of medical care have become nationwide problems that warrant greater efforts than
those that can be undertaken by any individual State.”).
77. Morreim, supra note 53, at 127-129.
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reporting standard 78 and definition of “medical malpractice 79 action or claim” 80
have hampered providers’ willingness to participate in ADR. 81 Essentially, any 82
settlement or judgment against a physician—regardless of the facts or dollar amount
paid—must be reported if, at any point, the patient submitted a “demand for payment.” 83 Thus, many providers would rather go to court where their chances of
prevailing are relatively high than settle and accept a permanent mark on their reputation. 84
Attempts at incorporating various ADR practices into the healthcare field have
proven ineffective at decreasing the frequency of medical malpractice claims. Thus,
the current system, which remains primarily adversarial and litigation-focused despite reforms, still fails to adequately resolve problems left in the wake of adverse
medical events. 85

V. THE STATE OF THE SYSTEM
The conventional system for addressing healthcare disputes falls short for two
primary reasons. First, medical care inherently exposes patients to risk. 86 When
risks materialize into errors, punishing individual physicians for often system-wide
problems is an ineffective catalyst for change. 87 Second, the adversarial process
inhibits communication precisely when it is most essential for both emotional and
financial reasons. 88 These factors create an unfortunate disconnect between published ethical guidelines and what doctors are told behind closed doors in the aftermath of unintended medical consequences. 89
78. 42 U.S.C. § 11131(a) (2018) (“Each entity (including an insurance company) which makes payment under a policy of insurance, self-insurance, or otherwise in settlement (or partial settlement) of, or
in satisfaction of a judgment in, a medical malpractice action or claim shall report . . . information respecting the payment and circumstances thereof.”).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 11137(d) (2018) (interestingly, the statute also states the following: “In interpreting
information reported under this subchapter, a payment in settlement of a medical malpractice action or
claim shall not be construed as creating a presumption that medical malpractice has occurred.”).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 11151(7) (2018) (“[A] written claim or demand for payment based on a health care
provider’s furnishing (or failure to furnish) health care services, and includes the filing of a cause of
action, based on the law of tort, brought in court of any State or the United States seeking monetary
damages.”).
81. Morreim, supra note 53, at 127-29.
82. Id. at 132-36 (stating providers can avoid NPDB reporting by paying out of pocket, waiving patient debt or offering refund payment, and initiating communication before the patient puts something in
writing); see also Christopher Guadagnino, Malpractice Mediation Poised to Expand, PHYSICIANS
NEWS DIG., https://physiciansnews.com/2004/04/23/malpractice-mediation-poised-to-expand/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2019) (“[I]f all parties can be brought to the mediation table soon enough, before a written
demand for compensation is presented by the plaintiff’s attorney to the physician defendant, a settlement
payment is not reportable to the NPDB”.).
83. Morreim, supra note 53, at 129.
84. Id. at 129-30.
85. Id. at 111.
86. Sonia Dahan, Dominique Ducard & Laurence Caeymaex, Apology in Cases of Medical Error Disclosure: Thoughts Based on a Preliminary Study, PLOS.ORG (July 31, 2017), https://journals.plos.org/pl
osone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0181854; see also Stephen E. Raper, No Role for Apology: Remedial Work and the Problem of Medical Injury, 11 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L., & ETHICS 267, 272
(2011) (“Each step in the medical process imposes the possibility of error and injury.”).
87. Raper, supra note 86, at 272.
88. Morreim, supra note 53, at 116.
89. Ebert, supra note 1, at 365.
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The ethical codes of both M.D.s and D.O.s suggest physicians should display
honesty and empathy following adverse events and errors. 90 According to the
American Medical Association, “a physician should at all times deal honestly and
openly with patients. . . . Concern regarding legal liability which might result following truthful disclosure should not affect the physician’s honesty.” 91 Similarly,
the American Osteopathic Association states that “physician[s] shall give a candid
account of the patient’s condition.” 92 If these are the codes physicians are expected
to adhere to, why do errors often go undisclosed? The Institute of Medicine takes
the stance that “[p]atient safety is . . . hindered through the liability system and the
threat of malpractice, which discourages the disclosure of errors.” 93
Even the most skilled, experienced, and focused physicians will face complications and adverse outcomes while on the job. 94 “The occurrence of an adverse
incident does not necessarily mean that the incident was caused by a breach in the
standard of care. Known complications from medical interventions and undesired
outcomes can and do occur absent medical negligence.” 95 Numerous studies have
shown there to be little connection between patients who suffer negligent injuries
and those who end up bringing a case in court. 96 A large majority of claims filed
involve injuries that are not actually a consequence of individual medical negligence but, rather, an anticipated risk of medical care or a symptom of a flaw within
a complex healthcare system. 97 In fact, payouts to plaintiffs are more strongly correlated with the severity of patients’ resulting disabilities than doctors’ negligent
acts. 98 Furthermore, the existing adversarial system teaches plaintiffs to pinpoint
blame on a single provider, a wholly ineffective approach to improving quality and
safety in a complicated, multi-player industry. 99 Punishing individual providers
neither deters future negligence nor improves care quality. 100 The routine “name,
blame, and shame” game is focused more on assigning fault than facilitating a dialogue to enhance the quality of medical care. 101
Even though most physicians recognize apologizing is the compassionate thing
to do, they may be reluctant to expose their careers and reputations to the “lawsuit
lottery.” 102 When insurers or employers anticipate litigation, they often “hush” providers, advising them not to discuss the circumstances of the adverse event with
patients or their families. 103 “Despite the benefits of apologies, potential defendants
have historically been counseled against apologizing because apologies themselves

90. Saitta & Hodge, supra note 4, at 302.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. INST. OF MED. ET AL., supra note 50.
94. Daniel J. D’Alesio Jr., A Litigation Attorney’s Formula for Changing the Factors That Influence
a Patient’s Decision to Sue, 11 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 58, 68 (2017).
95. Id. at 73.
96. Nussbaum, supra note 13, at 257.
97. Morreim, supra note 53, at 111.
98. Wei, supra note 14, at 140 (“[R]esearchers found that the severity of the patient’s disability, not
the presence of negligence, was more predictive of payment to plaintiff.”).
99. Morreim, supra note 53, at 119.
100. Id. at 113.
101. Id. at 117.
102. Wei, supra note 14, at 137.
103. Morreim, supra note 53, at 119.
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may . . . increase the likelihood that victims seek legal redress.” 104 Ironically, a
provider’s decision not to apologize or communicate with a patient for fear of litigation could itself be the precipitating cause of litigation. 105 One of the most commonly cited reasons why patients sue is that their questions were left unanswered
in the aftermath. 106 Patients may equate their provider’s silence with a lack of sympathy or remorse, then further assume the same harm will come to someone else in
the future if they do not act. 107 “A recipient’s interpretation of an apology as an
indication that the behavior will not be repeated may predict willingness to settle.” 108 Additionally, a patient who expects an apology but is not offered one might
develop feelings of resentment or anger, increasing his or her desire to sue. 109
How are physicians to console their patients without implying, from patients’
perspectives, a level of culpability? Massachusetts was the first state to address this
paradox and formally recognize the importance of facilitating consequence-free expressions of sympathy. 110

VI. THE ADVENT OF APOLOGY ACTS
In 1986, 111 Massachusetts enacted America’s pioneer apology law. 112 Since
then, 37 other states have enacted comparable statutes. 113 Apology laws fall into
two general categories: “partial” apology laws and “full” apology laws. 114 Five
states, denoted in the table below with asterisks, have full apology laws that offer
broad protections for statements of sympathy, fault, error, mistake, and even negligence. 115 The remaining 33 states have partial apology laws only pertaining to
statements of sympathy. 116 In other words, partial apology states protect statements
of “goodwill, such as regret, sympathy and benevolence,” while full apology states
permit admissions and self-critical expressions as well. 117 The following table lists
all states with apology statutes, the year in which each statute was enacted, and the
applicable citation.
Massachusetts

1986

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 233, § 23D

104. Benjamin J. McMichael, The Failure of “Sorry”: An Empirical Evaluation of Apology Laws,
Health Care, and Medical Malpractice, LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 3 (2017).
105. Erika R. Davis, I’m Sorry I’m Scared of Litigation: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Apology Laws,
3 FORUM: A TENN. STUDENT LEGAL J. 70, 78 (2016).
106. Morreim, supra note 53, at 120; see also Nussbaum, supra note 13, at 261 (stating “the menace of
tort litigation deters constructive, positive behavior such as open communication between patients and
providers.”).
107. Ebert, supra note 1, at 353.
108. Id. (citing Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination,
102 MICH. L. REV. 460, 479 (2003)).
109. Id. at 343.
110. Saitta & Hodge, supra note 4, at 304.
111. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 23D (West 2018) (“Statements, writings, or benevolent gestures expressing sympathy or a general sense of benevolence relating to the pain, suffering or death of a
person involved in an accident and made to such person or to the family of such person shall be inadmissible as evidence of an admission of liability in a civil action.”).
112. Saitta & Hodge, supra note 4, at 304.
113. McMichael, Van Horn & Viscusi, supra note 5, at 4.
114. Id. at 12.
115. Id. (Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, South Carolina, and Connecticut).
116. Id.
117. Dahan, Ducard & Caeymaex, supra note 86.
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Texas

1999

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 18.061

California

2000

CAL. EVID. CODE § 1160

Florida

2001

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.4026

Washington

2002

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.66.010

Tennessee

2003

TENN. R. EVID. § 409.1

Colorado*

2003

COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-135

Oregon

2003

OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 677.082

Maryland

2004

MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-920

North Carolina

2004

N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8C-1, 413

Ohio

2004

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.43

Oklahoma

2004

OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 63, § 1-1708.1H

Wyoming

2004

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-130

Connecticut*

2005

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-184d

Louisiana

2005

LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:3715.5

Maine

2005

ME. REV. STAT. TIT. 24, § 2907

Missouri

2005

MO. ANN. STAT. § 538.229

New Hampshire

2005

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-E:4

South Dakota

2005

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-19-411.1

Virginia

2005

VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.20:1

Arizona*

2005

A.R.S. § 12-2605

Georgia*

2005

O.C.G.A. § 24-4-416

Illinois

2005

735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/8-1901

Montana

2005

MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-814

West Virginia

2005

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-11A

Delaware

2006

DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 10, § 4318

Idaho

2006

IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-207

Indiana

2006

IND. CODE ANN. § 34-43.5-1-1 ET SEQ.

Iowa

2006

IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.31

South Carolina*

2006

S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-1-190

Utah

2006

UTAH R. EVID. 409

Vermont

2006

VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 12, § 1912

Hawaii

2006

HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626-1, RULE 409.5

Nebraska

2007

NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-1201

North Dakota

2007

N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 31-04-12

District of Columbia

2007

D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2841

Michigan

2011

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2155

Pennsylvania

2013

35 PA STAT. ANN. § 10228.3
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Data from 2012 through 2016 were aggregated to create the follow graph, 118
which displays the five highest and five lowest-ranked states based on annual per
capita malpractice costs. States with apology statutes are denoted with asterisks,
while the remaining states have no apology laws in place (though they may have
some other type of statutory reform). 119 New York, which does not have an apology
law, ranks number one with an average per capita cost of just over $33. 120 North
Dakota, which implemented an apology law in 2007, has the lowest per capita cost:
a mere $2.13. 121 Though correlation does not equal causation, it bears noting that
three of the five highest-cost states have not joined the apology trend, while four of
the five lowest-cost states have.

Even though these protections are now prevalent, doctors and their lawyers
must exercise caution when interpreting their specific state’s apology laws. 122 “Minor differences in the wording of a statute can have a dramatic effect on what a
court deems admissible evidence.” 123 Legally, there is a difference between acknowledging an adverse outcome—”I’m sorry that you are hurt”—and admitting
fault for a mistake that caused the outcome—”I’m sorry that I hurt you.” 124 An
expression of sympathy does not have to be a fault-admitting apology. 125 There are
nuances in the types of statements covered: mode of apology (orally versus in writing), to whom the apology may be given, and timeframes of admissibility. 126 Phy-

118. Belk, supra note 56.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Ebert, supra note 1, at 348.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 361 (citing Ashley A. Davenport, Note, Forgive and Forget: Recognition of Error and Use
of Apology as Preemptive Steps to ADR or Litigation in Medical Malpractice Cases, 6 PEPP. DISP.
RESOL. L.J. 81, 99 (2006)).
125. Ebert, supra note 1, at 352.
126. Saitta & Hodge, supra note 4, at 304-05.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2019/iss2/12

12

Afrassiab: Why Mediation & “Sorry” Make Sense: Apology Statutes as a Catalys

No. 2] Apology Statutes as a Catalyst for Change in Medical Malpractice

209

sicians must take care to understand the language of the particular statute that applies to them and be cognizant of its likely interpretation when communicating with
patients. 127
Most current case law suggests apologies are insufficient to show prima facie
medical negligence. 128 “Judges and juries understand that expression of sympathy,
regret, remorse and apology are not necessarily admissions of responsibility or liability.” 129 In fact, most juries view apologies favorably. 130 Yet, case law on this
subject is not, by any means, consistent. 131
“In some cases physician statements have been treated as an extrajudicial admission that establishes both the standard of care and its breach. . . . Equally as
many courts have found that apologies are insufficient evidence to establish the
standard of care or its breach. . . . Therefore, the case law on the legal liability of
apologies is not uniform or clear.” 132
The variation in the interpretation of physicians’ extrajudicial statements can
be partially attributed to differences in the language of apology statutes between
states. 133 Regardless of specific statutory language, however, apologies in general
can be used to encourage and improve mediation of medical negligence claims.

VII. THE EFFICACY OF EMPATHY
The therapeutic value of apologies is well-documented. 134 By reducing the
risks associated with apologizing, apology statutes aim to encourage physicians to
express sympathy, thereby lessening some of the anger felt by patients who have
experienced adverse events. 135 Physicians’ ability to offer condolences without repercussions can preserve doctor-patient relationships 136 and begin to heal patients’
emotional injuries. 137 “Trust is broken when an adverse medical event is concealed,
and trust is rebuilt with disclosure, apology, and responsibility.” 138 There may also
be financial benefits for providers and their institutions in the form of fewer malpractice lawsuits, quicker resolutions, and lower payouts in malpractice settlements. 139 Communication and compassion are key in minimizing the risk of claims
and lawsuits. 140 Honesty and transparency can “go a long way toward defusing a

127. Ebert, supra note 1, at 348.
128. Id. at 349 (“[T]he use of apologies and other extrajudicial statements made by [a] physician following a medical error are not alone sufficient to prove negligence.”).
129. Id. at 351 (citing Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination, 102 MICH. L. REV. 460, 470 (2003)).
130. Id.
131. Wei, supra note 14, at 113.
132. Id. at 111-13.
133. Ebert, supra note 1, at 348.
134. McMichael, Van Horn & Viscusi, supra note 5, at 7.
135. Id. at 12.
136. Dahan, Ducard & Caeymaex, supra note 86.
137. Ebert, supra note 1, at 340.
138. Gerald Monk, Stacey Sinclair & Michael Nelson, Narrative and Conflict: Explorations of Theory
and Practice, 3 DEP’T COUNSELING & SCH. PSYCHOL., SAN DIEGO ST. 25, 32 (2015).
139. D’Alesio, supra note 94, at 72 (“A physician’s objective, non-speculative, non-accusatory, and
compassionate communication to the patient concerning the outcome may reduce the likelihood of ensuing litigation or reduce the cost of litigation is a claim is made.”).
140. Id. at 68.
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patient’s initial reaction to sue for damages.” 141 If a patient does bring a claim, an
apology can serve to advance settlement talks. 142
While these benefits make sense in theory, some doubts have been raised as to
their legitimacy in practice. 143 Those skeptical of apology statutes argue plaintiffs’
attorneys are unlikely to introduce apologies or sympathetic statements as evidence
in malpractice cases, as it would be counterintuitive to their attempts to paint defendant physicians as indifferent or uncaring. 144 Others argue apologies may actually increase the number of claims by giving patients the idea to sue in the first
place. 145 Still others feel physician non-apology stems from factors beyond mere
legal liability, as even jurisdictions with more legal protection for doctors are not
more effective at encouraging disclosure and sympathetic expression. 146 Although
there have been attempts to quantify the impact of apology laws, tracking settlements and other resolutions outside the courtroom is difficult and often imprecise. 147 The recent consensus is that apology laws do not actually reduce physicians’ malpractice risk 148 or make patients safer in the healthcare setting. 149
Rather than denouncing the efficacy of apology statutes altogether, however,
states could use ADR—specifically mediation—to help reach the intended legislative goals of such statutes. Apologies, if offered sincerely and under the protection
of apology laws, can facilitate mediation by allowing physicians to openly
acknowledge when errors have occurred.

A. The Merits of Medical Mediation
While apology statutes exist in some form in thirty-eight states, only a few
states currently require parties in a medical malpractice dispute to mediate prior to
going to court. 150 In the remaining states, mediation is sorely underutilized. 151 Mediation can offer a forum for confidential, meaningful communication, and apology
statues can serve as a catalyst; together, they can move parties smoothly from adverse outcomes to resolution. If properly and timely employed, the apology-mediation combination can bypass many of the downfalls inherent in litigation that apology statutes originally sought to avoid. 152
Parties bear the cost of the mediator, and mediation requires minimal administrative resources, making it a cheaper alternative to other dispute resolution options. 153 Mediation also has extremely high satisfaction rates for both parties, cases
are typically closed within six months, and attorney fees are markedly decreased as

141. Id. at 59.
142. Taft, supra note 2, at 77.
143. Ebert, supra note 1, at 365.
144. Kass & Rose, supra note 12.
145. Wei, supra note 14, at 154.
146. Id. at 145.
147. Ebert, supra note 1, at 364.
148. McMichael, Van Horn & Viscusi, supra note 5, at 34.
149. Raper, supra note 86, at 316.
150. Michelle Andrews, Mediation Offers an Alternative to Malpractice Lawsuits, KAISER HEALTH
NEWS (Feb. 1, 2011), https://khn.org/news/michelle-andrews-on-malpractice-and-mediation/.
151. Id.
152. Morreim, supra note 53, at 121.
153. Nussbaum, supra note 13, at 279.
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compared to litigation. 154 In addition, private mediation negotiations are not “written claims or demands” under NPDB standards and thus would not unnecessarily
stain physician reputations. 155
Unlike litigation, mediation acknowledges the parties have goals beyond financial compensation 156 by allowing them to address their self-interests and emotions
in a less formal setting than a courtroom. 157 Perhaps more importantly, mediation
gives the parties autonomy to determine the best outcome—a mutually acceptable
resolution—based on those interests and emotions. 158 Distinct from the zero-sum
game of litigation, mediation offers the opportunity for a win-win through personalized solutions. 159 The confidentiality of mediation ensures parties can engage in
candid discussion. 160 In doing so, it balances physicians’ desires to be human and
patients’ desires to get answers. 161
Mediation, especially when tailored for the healthcare context, can be a starting
point for rebuilding trust and facilitating understanding between doctors and patients. 162 Rather than focusing only on past acts with a “battle” mentality, mediation
is forward-looking and relationship-focused. 163 When patients simply want to
know what went wrong, apology-mediation can help them “develop a thorough understanding of what happened before misconceptions and bogus information drive
them to the courthouse.” 164 Furthermore, even if the parties decide to proceed with
litigation, they have not lost anything; instead, they have potentially identified and
clarified issues prior to entering the courtroom. 165

B. A Sincere, Successful “I’m Sorry”
Medical school teaches physicians to examine, research, diagnose, and treat,
but not how to err and recover. 166 Rather than encouraging physicians to keep quiet,
legal counsel for healthcare organizations and independent providers should counsel doctors on the right way to say, “I’m sorry.” Health professionals report apologizing more often than patients report receiving apologies, indicating a disconnect
between doctor and patient views of what constitutes an apology. 167 In order for
the apology-mediation approach to be effective, physicians must understand patient

154. Sohn & Bal, supra note 10, at 1373.
155. Morreim, supra note 53, at 152; see also David T. Caldon, Medical Malpractice Disputes in the
Age of Managed Care, MEDIATE.COM, https://www.mediate.com/articles/caldon.cfm (last visited Mar.
28, 2019) (noting, however, the confidential nature of mediations prevents the development of legal
precedent, potentially wasting resources on previously-decided disputes).
156. Morreim, supra note 53, at 121.
157. Rita Lowery Gitchell & Andrew Plattner, Mediation: A Viable Alternative to Litigation for Medical Malpractice Cases, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 421, 422 (1999).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 423.
160. Id. at 444.
161. Id.
162. Monk, Sinclair & Nelson, supra note 138, at 35.
163. Gitchell & Plattner, supra note 157, at 425.
164. Morreim, supra note 53, at 123 (citing Boothman et al., supra note 59, at 142).
165. Gitchell & Plattner, supra note 157, at 423.
166. Sara M. Peskin, My Human Doctor, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
10/04/well/live/doctors-errors-apologies.html.
167. Nussbaum, supra note 13, at 300.
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perspectives and consider not just how patients will interpret what they say, but also
how they say it. 168
Typically, patients who have experienced an adverse event want to know three
things: why or how the incident happened, what the doctor has done to prevent
future incidents, and that the doctor is sorry for the outcome. 169 The doctor should
address each of these questions in plain language easily understandable to the patient. 170
Words like mistake, error, accident, mishap, and fault should be avoided because they imply blame. 171 Instead, physicians can convey empathy by verbally
acknowledging patients’ emotions regarding the situation (i.e., pain, anger, loss,
grief, confusion, etc.). 172 Unreasonably delayed or obviously scripted apologies
are counterproductive. 173 Providers should carefully consider their words before
approaching a patient, but apologies should be offered sooner rather than later (preferably within 72 hours). 174 Apologies should be authentic, not over-rehearsed, as
patients will likely assume insincerity or ulterior motives. 175 Though there is a long
way to go before the apology-mediation tactic takes hold, educating physicians on
the merits of apology and proper ways to apologize is a strong first step in the right
direction.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper examines influential case law, the history of medical malpractice,
failed attempts at ADR, the state of the tort system, apology legislation, and the
efficacy of apologizing in the medical context. Most importantly, it identifies an
untapped opportunity to further implement mediation to minimize costly medical
malpractice litigation. Moving forward, if physicians internalize the “right” way to
apologize, apology statutes can encourage patients and providers to engage in mediation above litigation. An authentic apology can ameliorate a patient’s anger and
confusion, which often prompt them to sue in the first place. 176 “It may be the best
medicine available to soothe the feelings of a patient or family and to avoid a malpractice lawsuit.” 177
All in all, apology statutes have promising potential to expand mediation in
healthcare. “Future implementations of ADR should focus on flexibility and early
interventions, and both first-generation tort reform and more consistent, comprehensive apology protection laws will almost certainly aid in its successful implementation.” 178 Apology statutes and medical mediation can and should be used in
tandem to overcome the undeniable downfalls of the adversarial system and preserve relationships between providers and patients often shattered following litigation.
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Ebert, supra note 1, at 363.
Morreim, supra note 53, at 123.
Gitchell & Plattner, supra note 157, at 446.
Ebert, supra note 1, at 361.
D’Alesio, supra note 94, at 78.
Ebert, supra note 1, at 363.
Id. at 362.
Id. at 363.
Saitta & Hodge, supra note 4, at 306.
Id.
Sohn & Bal, supra note 10, at 1374.
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